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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK H. PITTS and 
SANDRA J. PITTS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. No. 15010 
KIMBERLY B. McLACHLAN and 
CRAIG McLACHLAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants make this Petition for Rehearing for the 
r~son that fundamental errors were committed by the Court, 
both in arriving at its decision and in the preparation of 
its opinion. 
In the third paragraph of the opinion, in referring 
to the Uniform Real Estate Contract of October 7, 1975, the 
opinion states: 
"It was the type of contract that may be treated 
as a mortgage at the option of the seller, when 
and if the buyer defaults in its terms. The 
plaintiffs chose that procedure and foreclosed 
against the McLachlans * * *." 
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The contract is unusual, in that it provides for a 
small down payment, then for a payment of $2,000 the next 
month, then for two monthly payments of $210, and then for 
payment of the entire balance of $31,333.57 on the next month 
or January 8, 1976 (R. 4). It is true that Paragraph 16 of 
the contract provides the sellers with three options, namely 
to seek to forfeit the contract as liquidated damages under 
Option A, to sue for the delinquent installments under Option 
B, or to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable, 
treat the contract as a note and mortgage and pass title to 
the buyer subject thereto under Option C. 
The plaintiffs clearly elected to sue under Option! 
and brought action for the payment due January 8, 1976, pl~ 
taxes, interest and attorneys' fees, after giving credit for 
the previous installments paid. (It will be noted that ilie 
contract erroneously uses the balance of $31,333.57 as the 
approximate amount of the installment due on or before 
January 8, 1976, failing to deduct, in the recitations of 
the contract, the payment of $2,000 due on October 28, 1975.1 
(Amended Complaint, R. 9, ,, 4) There is not one word in the 
Complaint (R. 2 and 3) or the Amended Complaint (R. 9 and 1~1 
about treating the contract as a mortgage and bringing actio: 
to foreclose. 
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The Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 13-14) states the 
basis of the judgment to be obtained and refers to it as: 
"The due date of the payment of the balance 
owing is plain from the contract and from 
the affidavit** *." 
The affidavit offered as the basis for the summary judgment 
likewise simply refers to the payments made as required by the 
contract, recognizes the $2,000 which was paid on December 15 
rnstead of October 28, 1975, and calculates the balance of the 
balloon payment due January 8, 1976 to be $29,333.57. Again, 
there is no statement referring to the passage of title or the 
foreclosure of a mortgage. (R. 15) 
This error of the Court in considering this to be an 
action where the sellers passed title and sought to foreclose 
as a mortgage is fundamental, because the case deals with the 
matter of where title stood and in whose name. The defendants-
respondents took the position that title passed to the buyers 
jointly and equally simply by the entry of the judgment. That 
is the basis of the action filed by the creditors of Craig 
McLachlan. Appellants sought correction of the summary judgment, 
not for the purpose of undoing the passage of title effectuated 
by a mortgage foreclosure election, but to clarify the situation 
and to eliminate the question of whether title passed in a 
~nner contrary to the recitations of the contract itself. 
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Appellants did not and do not concede that title passt 
and cited authorities that this issue must be determined favort 
to passage of title in a proceeding designed to that specific 
objective. Houston Oil Co. v. Randolph, 251 s.w. 794, 28 A.L.i 
926 (Tex. 1923), (cited at page 15 of appellant's Brief); 
Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d 207, 159 A.L.R, 852; 
and 4 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, 11 39 0 and 39 3 (cited at pages 4 
and 5 of appellant's Reply Brief). 
In that same third paragraph of the opinion, the Court 
makes another mistaken assumption in the last sentence of that 
paragraph, where it states: 
0 The property then appeared as of record in 
the names of Kimberly B. and Craig McLachlan 
(as evidenced later in the Sheriff's documents 
at execution sale) . " 
The execution directs the Sheriff to sell: 
0
* * * the unexempted real property of the 
defendants in accordance with the praecipe 
attached hereto." (R. 29) 
And it will be noted that there is no praecipe attached to the 
execution and the praecipe was not included in the record, 
presumably because delivered only to the Sheriff. 
Then the Sheriff's return recites that he has: 
0 * * * attached and levied upon all the right, 
title claim and interest of Kimberly B. McLachlan 
and C;aig McLachlan, defendants, or either of them, 
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of, in and to the following described real estate 
standing on the records of Salt Lake County in 
the name of Kimberly B. McLachlan and Craig 
McLachlan * * * [describing the property involved]." 
This is not a recital that any property stands in the name of 
the McLachlans or either of them and the same return on the 
execution recites that there is to be sold the property des-
cribed, 
"* * * together with the rights of the vendor 
in the garage and right of way in the rear or 
to the north of said premises." 
thus indicating that the description was not taken from the 
County records where the Sellers would have been grantors and 
not vendors. The Sheriff simply used his printed form and 
proceeded to sell any interest of the McLachlans under a 
contract and based on a judgment obtained on that contract. 
These two erroneous assumptions made by the Court are 
fundamental in this case. The Court assumes that title passed 
to Kimberly B. and Craig McLachlan by reason of election to fore-
clpse and to pass title to somebody, and the Court finds two 
names on the Sheriff's return of execution and concludes that 
title was passed to Kimberly and Craig McLachlan. Appellants 
had sought to raise before this court the issue of the right to 
correct a summary judgment so as to avoid litigation over the 
question of whether title passed and to whom. Because of the 
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Court's assumptions, the Court did not consider the case in its 
proper light, namely, 
"Must it now be determined whether title 
passed, or can the appellants correct the 
summary judgment in order to avoid litigation 
for determination of where title reposes and 
to what extent?" 
The Court's opinion treats the matter as though plaintiffs 
made a mistake in the beginning in electing to pass title ~d 
foreclose as though it were a mortgage. This was not the case 
and not the election and the Court should re-examine its entire 
opinion for the effect these mistaken assumptions make in the 
analysis of the entire position of appellants. 
Admittedly, the Court could still find that the Distric 
Court correctly denied the motion; but before doing that, the 
Court should appraise the case as it actually arose and with no 
passage of title except as that might be involved by reason 
of the entry of a judgment for the balance due. Whether title 
passec;l and to whom is not before the Court in this action for 
adjudication. Appellants simply state the possibility ~at 
title passed and to somebody and ask the Court to eliminate 
that question for the reasons cited in the Brief and referred 
to in the Court's opinion, reflecting appellant's position 
that there are involved, in addition to-inadvertence, ~e givin! 
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of additional time to the respondents to perform the contract, 
avoiding a windfall to defendants and their judgment creditors 
at the expense of plaintiffs, avoiding a multiplicity of actions, 
and giving performance of the contract in the manner contemplated 
by the parties in which Kimberly McLachlan was the buyer and 
craig McLachlan was the co-signer or guarantor. 
Appellants submit that the Court should grant a re-
hearing in this matter so that reconsideration of the entire 
matter may be had by the Court, with no assumptions as to the 
passage of title, but title to be considered only in light of 
the uncertainty that exists as to passage of title where vendors 
bring an action for the past due installment of a contract, 
which in this case happens to be the balloon payment at the end 
of the contract. 
~e7!1311ytJ submi ~! nn ~r£~. 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. of 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Petition for Rehearing was served 
on the Respondents this 8th day of August, 1977, by mailing 
true and correct copies thereof, postage prepaid, to David M. 
Bown and Stephen R. McCaughey, attorneys for Respondents, 
321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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